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to the propagation of aggregate shocks. Time series data for the 1995-2003 period are applied
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emanating from bank markups that would entail an ampliﬁcation of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
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practically small.
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Cyclical variations of price-cost margins in goods markets have received considerable attention as they
represent an important channel through which aggregate shocks are propagated. Several authors
argue for shrinking markups in economic upturns. Countercyclical collusion - oligopolists behave
more competitively in periods of high demand - is the rationale in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992). Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995, 1996), on the other
hand, argue that capital-market imperfections (liquidity constraints) lead to varying markups over the
business cycle. In recessions, ﬁrms have low cash ﬂow and more diﬃculties to raise external funds, so
they try to boost current proﬁts (by raising prices) to meet their liabilities and ﬁnance investment.1
As a third reason for countercyclical markups of price over marginal cost, Chevalier and Scharfstein
(1996) quote procyclical demand elasticities. Imperfectly competitive ﬁrms therefore raise markups
in recessions. The empirical evidence on the issue, however, is mixed.2
Comparable analyses of markups in the banking industry are scarce. This is surprising, having
in mind the enormous relevance of loans in corporate ﬁnancing. A somewhat related strand of
the literature emphasizes the cyclicality of “markups” in ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancing conditions as a
propagation channel of real and monetary shocks. The ﬁnancial accelerator hypothesis (Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1996) argues that the external ﬁnance premium (the wegde between the cost
of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds raised internally) changes endogenously
with aggregate ﬂuctuations. As the ﬁnancial position of borrowers moves procyclically, the agency
cost premium in external ﬁnancing shrinks in economic upturns and provokes an ampliﬁcation of
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations through its eﬀects on the spending decisions of borrowers. In empirical
applications, the external ﬁnance premium is mostly measured by the yield diﬀerence of corporate
and government bonds. Many authors examine its predictive power for macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
(Gertler and Lown 1999, de Bondt 2004, Mody and Taylor 2004).
Movements in interest rate spreads can be related to arguments of both parts of the literature
as there are spreads that may be understood as banking markups or external ﬁnance premiums.
Additionally, spending decisions of households over the cycle may be aﬀected by endogenous vari-
ations in spreads between interest rates on consumer credit and deposits. The common empirical
literature on bank “markups” has two attributes. First, mainly ex-post measures are analyzed (for
panels of banks or banking sectors), like the net interest margin (net interest income divided by
total or interest-earning assets) and implicit spreads (average lending less average borrowing rates)
calculated by using data from bank income statements and balance sheets. Compared to (ex-ante)
spreads involving contractual retail interest rates, these measures have severe drawbacks as proxies
for ﬁnancing conditions of ﬁrms and households as they do not solely represent price (interest rate)
developments. Among other things, variations in balance-sheet volumes and structure (changes in
the sources of interest income and expenses or even between diﬀerent kinds of credit, for example) as
well as nonperforming loans can make it hard to tell why margins actually rose or fell. Ex-ante spreads
1are rarely analyzed. Exceptions are Dueker and Thornton (1997) and Corvoisier and Gropp (2002),
whose ﬁndings point to spreads moving countercyclically. Second, some authors apply GDP (growth)
or another measure of aggregate demand as a control variable, but the results are generally not re-
lated to the cyclicality literature.3 The grand exception is Dueker and Thornton (1997). Their model
with capital market frictions (i.c. switching costs) predicts that a risk-averse and proﬁt-smoothing
bank management sets a countercyclical markup of lending rates over the cost of funds.
In this paper, the cyclical behavior of quarterly Austrian interest rate spreads over the period
1995-2003 is analyzed. Compared with the previous literature on bank margins and spreads, this
involves the following advantages. As we calculate spreads from contractual interest rates, they are
almost (as also other conditions in loan and deposit contracts may change) immediately interpretable
as bank markups and ﬁnancing premiums. The use of quarterly data enables a genuine examination
of bank markup cyclicality because short-term cycles are not hidden as in the numerous analyses of
yearly panel data. On the other hand, there is no need to search for proxy variables of the business
cycle as with higher-frequency data (as in Dueker and Thornton 1997). Unless the single-equation
models of most studies, our methodological framework addresses simultaneity and identiﬁcation
issues. Examining the relations for a single country a priori precludes cross-country diﬀerences to
perturb the results in an unintended way.
Austria is a perfect candidate to be analyzed because of the strong bank dependence in external
corporate ﬁnancing and because the conduct of the Austrian banking sector is sometimes presumed
dampening the business cycle. Braumann (2004) argues that a long-time state inﬂuence, liquidity-
providing bank networks, the high share of non-proﬁt banks and the maintenance of pronounced bank-
customer relationships led the Austrian banking sector to even contribute to a ﬁnancial decelerator
in the past. According to the notion that a ﬁnancial accelerator should be associated with narrowing
spreads when credit growth is high, he shows that, for the diﬀerence between loan and deposit
interest rates, the opposite is the case in Austria.4 Our ﬁndings conﬁrm Braumann (2004) as the
examined interest rate spreads rise in economic upturns. While this, in principle, is against a ﬁnancial
accelerator mechanism pertinent to the Austrian banking sector, responses of interest rate spreads
to shocks in GDP growth turn out to be practically small and statistically insigniﬁcant in most cases.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the empirical
literature on the cyclical behavior of interest rate spreads and the determinants of net interest margins
and spreads. Details about the data are to be found in section 3, and section 4 describes the methods
used. Our results are reported in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Dueker and Thornton (1997) examine the diﬀerential between the prime lending rate and the rate
on 180-day certiﬁcates of deposit as an aggregate loan markup in the U.S. banking industry. As
2the corresponding data (for the 1973-1993 period) is weekly, common business cycle indicators do
not apply. By using the spread between the commercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate as
an alternative measure, they ﬁnd evidence for a countercyclical behavior of the loan markup. The
theoretical reasoning provided is that because of switching costs, banks have some market power over
their customers. For the bank, a trade-oﬀ emerges between enlarging its market share and monopoly
pricing of the existing customer base, and the business cycle aﬀects this trade-oﬀ if banks prefer
smooth proﬁt streams. For either this reason, or because of the adverse selection of loan applicants
they would face otherwise, banks opt for relatively high markups in cyclical downturns instead of a
larger market share. Dueker and Thornton (1997) conclude that by mitigating these capital market
imperfections an attenuation of business cycles would be possible.
Also the results of Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) point to countercyclicality of interest spreads.
With yearly data (1995-1999) on contractual interest rates from 11 euro area countries, they study
the determinants of lending spreads (lending rates less a money market rate) and deposit spreads (the
money market rate less the respective deposit rate). As higher producer conﬁdence lowers deposit
spreads and higher consumer conﬁdence lowers loan spreads, their results suggest a countercyclical
behavior of the loan-deposit rate diﬀerential.5
There is an extensive literature on the (empirical) bank or banking-sector related determinants
of interest spreads. A popular starting point is the so-called dealership model of Ho and Saunders
(1981) in which banks are seen as dynamic dealers in loans and deposits. According to this theory, the
demand for loans and the supply of deposits arrive asynchronously at random time intervals. For every
planning period, the representative (risk-averse) bank selects optimal loan and deposit rates which
should minimize the risks of excessive demand for loans or insuﬃcient supply of deposits (Angbazo
1997). As emerging from the theoretical model, the main determinants of the optimal diﬀerential
between the loan and deposit rate are the extent of competition in the markets, the interest rate risk
to which the bank is exposed, the degree of risk aversion of the bank management and the size of bank
transactions. Several authors have extended the basic framework of the dealership model, including
Allen (1988) who introduced diﬀerent types of bank products and Angbazo (1997) who added credit
default risk as an additional explanatory factor. Another model of the interest rate spread is provided
by the ﬁrm-theoretical approach explored in, for example, Wong (1997). In this (static) setting, loan
and deposit markets are simultaneously cleared by demand and supply adjustments.6 Although the
model of Wong (1997) yields implications which are quite similar to those from the dealership model,
some additional explanatory factors emerge, as regulation, operating costs and equity capital.
In empirical analyses, the preferred measures to be explained are not interest rate spreads but
net interest margins (NIM, net interest income divided by total or earning assets) as used in e.g.
Angbazo (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos
and de Guevara (2004) and Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003). Returns on assets (ROA) or equity (ROE)
make up the dependent variable in Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004), Chirwa (2003), but also in
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003). Furthermore, most empirical
3studies have applied annual panel data for banks or countries’ banking sectors. As a consequence,
their results cannot be directly compared to the ones we will report in section 5. The determinants
of interest margins from these articles shall nevertheless be quoted in the next paragraphs, as they
will be used as control variables in our analysis.7
According to the structure performance hypothesis, an increase in banking sector concentration
leads, through lower costs of collusion, to an extraction of rents via higher interest spreads. On the
other hand, the eﬃcient structure hypothesis proposes a negative relation, because the increase in
concentration is due to the growth of the most eﬃcient banks (having lower spreads) or these banks
taking over the less eﬃcient ones (Corvoisier and Gropp 2002). The share of the top 3 banks in
total assets is found to positively aﬀect the ROA in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), whereas
the individual bank’s market share and the ROE are negatively related in Goddard et al. (2004).8
Herﬁndahl indices (the sum of squared market shares) also reﬂect changes in the market structure
between smaller banks. A positive relation is found by Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) to the diﬀerence
between contractual lending rates and money market rates, and a negative one for some diﬀerentials
calculated with deposit rates (money market less deposit rates).
The generation of non-interest income, reﬂecting the importance of fee-based services, is
supposed to occur partly at the expense of interest income (Bikker and Haaf 2002). Indeed, Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) ﬁnd a negative relation to net interest margins, and Bikker and
Haaf (2002) observe that the interest income, relative to total assets, shrinks following increases in
other income. Rising operating costs (overheads) are passed on to the customers in the form of
higher margins according to Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) who observe a positive relation of
margins to the operating-expense ratio (the share of operating expenses in total assets). Maudos
and de Guevara (2004) argue that the cost-income ratio (operating costs divided by total income)
represents the quality of management in selecting highly proﬁtable assets and low-cost liabilities.
With increasing management quality in this sense, lower operating costs are required in order to
generate one unit of income, hence margins are supposed to be higher. Maudos and de Guevara
(2004) ﬁnd the cost-income ratio to be highly negatively signiﬁcant for the net interest margin.
The equity ratio is usually supposed to measure the risk aversion of banks. According to
this reasoning, banks want to be highly capitalized and, on account of this, lend more prudentially.
Consequently, interest income could become lower, via lower-risk lending with lower interest rates.
However, more infrequently occuring loan defaults counteract this eﬀect. A high equity ratio might
be an indication of banks operating over-cautiously, ignoring potentially proﬁtable diversiﬁcation or
other opportunities (Goddard et al. 2004). Another view, also leading to propose a negative relation
of the equity ratio with interest margins, is that a reduction of the equity share means that the
insolvency risk increases. Shareholders therefore demand higher returns and banks increase their
interest margins to compensate them accordingly. Opposed arguments highlight that high equity
capital stocks increase the average cost of capital. Maudos and de Guevara (2004) accentuate the
role of equity capital to insulate banks from expected and unexpected (credit) risk. As holding equity
4capital is relatively costly compared to debt (because of tax and dilution of control reasons), banks
with high capital ratios for regulatory or credit reasons seek to recover some of these costs in the form
of higher net interest margins (Saunders and Schumacher 2000, Angbazo 1997, Drakos 2003). Some
theories also suggest that well-capitalized banks face lower expected bankruptcy costs and hence may
have lower funding costs. According to this view, higher bank equity ratios imply larger net interest
margins when loan rates vary only slightly with bank equity (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004). A positive
relation of the equity ratio to interest margins and proﬁts is found in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Angbazo (1997), as well
as in Drakos (2003). The inﬂuence of the capital ratio on the ROE is negative in Goddard et al.
(2004), illustrating that banks that take more risk have higher proﬁts, which is in accordance with
portfolio theory. However, in view of the regulations on minimum equity, results obtained using the
equity ratio as a measure of risk aversion should be interpreted with caution (Maudos and de Guevara
2004).
The implicit taxation associated with reserve and liquidity requirements is also an often-
proposed determinant of interest margins and spreads. Measures of liquidity used in the literature
diﬀer by which items they include (cash, central bank balances, interbank claims). If more assets
are to be held in cash, reserves or liquid assets, interest income goes down because of the lower risk
of and lower interest rates on these assets. However, banks may like to restore interest income by
passing the respective losses in interest income on to their customers in the form of higher margins.
The ﬁrst (negative) eﬀect is found in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for reserves divided by
total deposits. Cash and due (used as a proxy for reserves) is positively related to the NIM in Maudos
and de Guevara (2004). The share of loans in total assets is often also understood as an illiquidity
measure or, if data on loan loss provisions is unavailable, as a proxy for credit risk (Maudos and
de Guevara 2004). Besides illiquidity and risk premiums, a higher loan ratio should be associated
with higher interest margins because loans are the interest-bearing assets with the highest rates. The
empirical relation to the NIM is mostly found to be positive (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999,
Chirwa 2003, Maudos and de Guevara 2004). However, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report
a negative relation to the return on assets.
Also the importance of the banking sector or, respectively, the structure of the ﬁnancial system
is supposed to have an inﬂuence on interest margins, spreads and banking proﬁts. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt
and Huizinga (1999) ﬁnd a negative relation of the ratio of bank assets to GDP with the NIM and the
ROA, supposed to reﬂect more intense interbank competition in countries with larger markets. The
same variable has a positive eﬀect on interest rate diﬀerentials in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002). A
positive eﬀect on the NIM is found for the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999), supporting a complementary relation between stock market and bank
ﬁnance (but they also report a negative inﬂuence of stock market capitalization to banking assets).
Ex-ante interest rate diﬀerentials seem to be negatively aﬀected by stock market capitalization to
GDP (Corvoisier and Gropp 2002). Implicit interest payments (IIP, appearing also in Ho and Saunders
51981 and Angbazo 1997) are a measure for“free”banking services that are oﬀered instead of explicitly
charging extra interest on deposits (Maudos and de Guevara 2004). However, for these services banks
could not only charge through a lower remuneration of liabilities, but also via higher lending rates
or both. The eﬀect of a rise in IIP is found to be indeed positive on the NIM in Saunders and
Schumacher (2000) and Maudos and de Guevara (2004). The reason for this is that the trend
towards more explicit pricing of services (by fees and commissions) has reduced the IIP and therefore
reduced margins.
Some macroeconomic determinants of banks’ interest margins and proﬁts shall also be dis-
cussed. Daily or weekly interest rates are often used to calculate measures of interest rate volatility
and the associated risk. Eﬀects on the net interest margin are typically positive (Saunders and Schu-
macher 2000, Maudos and de Guevara 2004). Although GDP per capita (as a measure of economic
development, but also banking technology) is found to have no statistically signiﬁcant relation to
the NIM in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), the ROA increases with GDP per capita. Using
real GDP growth as a demand side indicator, Goddard et al. (2004) ﬁnd a positive relation to the
return on equity. GDP growth is insigniﬁcant in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), but negatively
associated with the net interest margin in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004). Other potential determinants
(not used as often) in net interest margin and proﬁtability regressions are, for example, the impor-
tance of oﬀ-balance-sheet business (Goddard et al. 2004), the ratio of non-interest-earning to total
assets (Saunders and Schumacher 2000), the inﬂation rate (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999), the
share of problem loans (Corvoisier and Gropp 2002), and the real interest rate (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and
Huizinga 1999). Bank size is also an issue because of economies of scale, but its supposed positive
eﬀect may be partially oﬀset by greater ability to diversify resulting in lower risk and a lower required
return (Chirwa 2003). Nevertheless, a positive relation to the NIM is found by Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999). In cross-country studies other factors still play a role, such as whether there is a
deposit insurance scheme, the explicit taxation of the banking sector, (interest rate) regulation, as
well as legal and institutional factors. Across banks, it might be of signiﬁcance whether a bank is
state-owned or foreign.
3 Data issues and variable selection
3.1 Remarks on the data and recent developments in Austrian banking
Retail rates used in calculating interest rate spreads come from the national interest rate statistics
and were, in this form, compiled from 1995 until June 2003 (see appendix A for detailed information
about the data used in this study). Data on proﬁt and loss account items for the Austrian banking
sector comes from quarterly bank reports and balance sheet data from monthly balance sheet reports
(almost all banks operating in Austria have to report on the legal basis of the Austrian Banking Act).
In general (exceptions as indicated in appendix A), the data source is the Austrian Central Bank (the
6Oesterreichische Nationalbank, OeNB), and the sample period ranges from the ﬁrst quarter of 1995
to the second quarter of 2003.
In the last 20 years, the Austrian banking sector has undergone some large structural changes
(see also Ali and Gstach 2000, Braumann 2004 and Waschiczek 2005). The most important structural
break from deregulation occured in 1994, when Austria joined the European Economic Area (EEA).
It is common opinion that the associated removal of entry barriers (freedom of establishment)9 had
substantial eﬀects on bank proﬁtability. Additional changes were, for example, the abolition of the
anchor or central interest rate for deposit rates, the implementation of Stage III of the European
Monetary Union, changes in capital requirements, ﬁnancial (technological) innovations, as well as an
altered ownership structure of banks (privatization of public sector stakes in Austrian banks, asso-
ciated with more foreign ownership). Waschiczek (2005) describes the observable disintermediation
trend as a process which is driven mainly by enterprises making use of expanded ﬁnancing options
(corporate bonds, share issues, venture capital), but not by a more restrictive corporate sector lending
of banks or changes in the investment decisions of households. While the relative importance of bank
intermediation has declined, the competitive pressure of euro area banks has remained fairly low to
date relating to the physical presence of these banks on the Austrian market (Waschiczek 2005).
However, the potential increase in competition (due to entry threat) is also important. Gischer and
J¨ uttner (2003) argue that competition in the banking sector is of an increasingly global nature, above
all, in wholesale markets, the trading business, as well as in debt securities and share markets. Loans
and deposits are not concerned that much because local ties between banks and their customers are
important. A higher degree of competition in banking should, via lower monopoly power and an
incentive to reduce costs, lead to the reduction of prices with positive eﬀects on investment, growth
and welfare (Weill 2004). Waschiczek (2005) lists increased activity in mergers and acquisitions, the
cutting of resources and the increased business activities in Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries as the strategic responses of Austrian banks to these changing conditions.
For selected years, Table 1 shows the percentage division of assets and liabilities of the Austrian
banking sector (domestic and foreign assets are separated). On the assets side, it can be seen that
the shares of cash and central bank balances, interbank claims and loans (despite the rising share
of loans to foreign non-banks) have decreased over time. On the other hand, the share of foreign
securities and participations increased from 2.5 (1995) to 10 percent (2003). The liabilities side of
the balance sheet displays a sharp decrease in non-bank deposits at the expense of foreign issues of
secured debt. Structural changes and the subsequent reactions of the Austrian banking sector also
guided the variable selection process. The loan ratio, which has been declining at the expense of
securities and participations, displays some of the consequences of deregulation and liberalization.
Other examples include changes in concentration and openness of the banking sector, as well as an
increased relevance of non-interest income. The latter is partly due to the accelerated competition
in the interest business from the mid-1990s on, the fact that Austrian ﬁrm have increasingly sought
non-bank ﬁnance and households’ heightened investment via capital market instruments.
7Table 1: Shares in the total banking sector balance sheeta
Balance sheet items 1995 2000 2003
Assets
Cash and central bank balances 1.6 1.1 1.0
Domestic interbank claims 16.3 17.7 15.8
Loans to domestic non-banks 45.1 38.7 39.7
Domestic securities and participations 12.7 12.1 11.3
Foreign interbank claims 13.4 10.2 10.8
Loans to foreign non-banks 5.0 7.7 8.0
Foreign securities and participations 2.5 9.2 10.0
Liabilities
Domestic interbank liabilities 17.4 19.1 17.1
Domestic non-bank deposits 38.4 31.0 33.0
Domestic issues of secured debt 13.1 11.2 11.5
Domestic equity capital 4.5 4.5 4.8
Foreign interbank liabilities 12.0 16.0 12.5
Foreign non-bank deposits 5.2 5.2 4.9
Foreign issues of secured debt 4.8 9.1 11.6
Foreign equity capital 0.1 0.1 0.3
a Calculations are based on averages of the reported monthly (end-of-month) stocks.
3.2 Interest spreads
Retail interest spreads are ex-ante measures of bank behavior and performance. The main attention
will be paid to diﬀerences between contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on deposits
(both relating to new business). Due to a comparatively higher correlation with all the lending rates,
the loan-deposit spreads are calculated via the the longer-term deposit rate (which is simply termed
savings rate in the remainder of the paper). Nevertheless, we will also examine the spreads of lending
rates (on commercial, consumer, housing, hypothecary and municipal loans) over the cost of funds
in the debt market (the cost of issuing debt, which is proxied by the secondary market yield of
bonds issued by Austrian banks). These measures will be called lending rate premiums because they
can be interpreted as external bank ﬁnance premiums if we assume that bond yields represent the
ﬁrms’ opportunity cost of internally generated funds and that yields of bank bonds evolve similarly
to other bond yields. Results for spreads of lending and deposit rates (savings deposits with an
agreed maturity of up to or over 12 months) over the cost of borrowing from the central bank or
in the interbank market will not be reported.10 Figure 1 exemplarily shows the development of the
commercial credit rate spreads over time. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the interest rate
spreads and premiums.
8Figure 1: Spread and premium of the commercial credit interest rate
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of interest rate spreads
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Commercial credit spread 3.37 0.31 2.92 4.02
Consumer credit spread 4.45 0.48 3.85 5.57
Housing credit spread 2.96 0.26 2.57 3.53
Hypothecary credit spread 2.77 0.25 2.37 3.26
Municipal credit spread 1.86 0.35 1.17 2.52
Commercial credit premium 1.54 0.49 0.64 2.23
Consumer credit premium 2.62 0.62 1.60 3.67
Housing credit premium 1.13 0.49 0.20 1.83
Hypothecary credit premium 0.94 0.47 0.08 1.61
Municipal credit premium 0.03 0.49 -0.88 0.84
3.3 Explanatory and control variables
The proposed determinants of interest spreads that enter our analysis (see also Table 3 and appendix
A)11 include two measures applicable for an examination of the spreads’ cyclical behavior. GDP
growth is our measure of the business cycle and the banks’ business opportunities. In studying
the eﬀects of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on bank spreads, interest rate developments should be
controlled for in order to avoid that business cycle eﬀects are mingled with reactions to endogenous
changes in monetary policy rates. On the other hand, the variation of banking-related measures over
the interest rate cycle is rewarding on its own. Our presumptions follow the observation from the
interest rate transmission literature (e.g. Sander and Kleimeier 2004) that, in periods of monetary
tightening, interest rates on bank liabilities are more sluggish than those on assets and vice versa.
Consequently, increases in short-term interest rates should lead to rising spreads between lending and
deposit rates. The state in the interest cycle is represented by the overnight money market rate.
9The measure of competition used is a concentration ratio, the share of the top 10 banks in total
assets. As there is no clear relation of concentration and competition a priori (structure performance
vs. eﬃcient structure hypothesis), the literature proposes diﬀerent other approaches to quantify
competition and market contestability. Unfortunately, these methods (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic
or the degree of market power of the average bank calculated via the Breshnahan-Lau method) are
not applicable for a single-country analysis with aggregate time series. Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003)
describe the increasingly global nature of competition in banking. As a ﬁrst related proxy variable,
they propose the ratio of fee to interest income, which measures the (deregulation-induced) explicit
pricing of services and therefore also replaces the implicit interest payments variable. Bikker and
Groeneveld (2000) support the consideration of other income parts (from trading etc.) in relating
non-interest income to interest income. These income parts are raised from business which is subject
to more intense (and global) competition than the credit business. A summary measure should
emerge for the degree to which banks have adjusted to the new ﬁnancial deregulation environment.
In the end, a rise in non-interest income is supposed to represent technological advances, product-mix
changes (expansion of low-risk activities) and the banks’ exposure to international competition. A
negative inﬂuence on interest spreads should be exerted if the shift to explicit pricing of services
through fees and to other non-interest income narrowed markups in the interest business. Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt et al. (2004) argue that well-developed fee income sources will produce lower interest margins
due to cross-subsidization of bank activities. We use the share of non-interest income in total
operating income, with the non-interest income including net fee and commissions, income from
securities and participations and net ﬁnancial operations income. The second global competition
variable applied by Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) is the openness of the ﬁnancial sector which they
measure by the share of foreign assets and foreign liabilities of the country in GDP. In this paper, on
the other hand, a banking-sector related measure is proposed, which is the sum of foreign assets and
liabilites of the banking sector divided by its total assets. The expected sign is also negative.
The share of the book value of equity in total assets is used as the equity capital measure.12
As mentioned before, there are arguments for eﬀects of the changes in the equity ratio on interest
spreads in both directions. Banks that hold a high fraction of liquid assets have lower net interest
margins (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004). A measure of liquid assets that includes cash, central bank
balances and interbank claims cannot be used along with a loans ratio, because until the end of
1993, the two ratios were almost perfectly collinear (the shares of other assets in total assets were
constant). Instead, we use the share of cash and central bank balances in total assets as a potential
determinant of interest rate spreads. The respective share of loans in total assets (commercial,
consumer, housing, hypothecary or municipal loans) and the cost-income ratio (CIR) make up the
remaining explanatory variables. Following common calculation rules for the CIR, expenses include
staﬀ, general administration and some other expenses, but no interest and fee-based expenses. The
latter are usually deducted from the respective income ﬁgures (so that net interest and net fee-based
income are added up along with other income).
10Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum
Commercial loans ratio 22.87 0.85 21.50 24.57
Consumer loans ratio 10.47 0.48 9.89 11.56
Housing loans ratio 7.01 0.40 6.38 7.72
Hypothecary loans ratio 9.69 0.45 9.12 10.55
Municipal loans ratio 1.71 0.20 1.31 1.95
Overnight money market rate 3.53 0.68 2.44 4.84
GDP growth 2.21 1.24 -0.36 4.64
Openness 52.95 5.29 42.98 60.39
Concentration ratio 56.69 1.51 54.47 59.09
Equity ratio 4.80 0.16 4.54 5.09
Cash ratio 1.25 0.23 0.91 1.73
Share of non-interest income in total income 35.64 5.08 26.13 43.63
Cost-income ratio 68.67 2.29 63.63 72.82
4 Methodology
In analyzing time series data for the Austrian banking sector we use vector autoregressive (VAR)
models and therefore treat each variable as potentially endogenous.13 Unsurprisingly, the Schwarz
information criterion leads us to chose one lag in each case (see section 5) as a consequence of
the small number of observations and the rather large number of variables. In the end, results
from impulse response analysis from VAR models where the variables are in levels with a time trend
also included (following the recommendations of Ashley and Verbrugge 2004, for the estimation of
impulse response functions and conﬁdence intervals for same) are presented. Responses to unit shocks
for a maximum time horizon of four quarters will be reported. In obtaining structural responses,
the underidentiﬁcation problem is solved by applying a recursive structure (causal chain) to the
contemporaneous relations between our variables. Technically, this amounts to using the so-called
Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals to
recover the structural shocks. For each spread (and premium), we estimate a reduced-form VAR
(with a lag order of one) where, for example, the spread equation is speciﬁed as
SPREADt = µ +
j X
i=1
αjRHSj,t−1 + βGROWTHt−1 + γMMRt−1 + φZ + t (1)
where RHSj stands for j explanatory variables apart from GDP growth (GROWTH) and the overnight
MMR. Z is for additional deterministic terms (e.g. trend, seasonal dummies). The reported impulse
response functions θk (the dynamic impacts of unexpected shocks in time k) come from the vector
moving average representation of the VAR




where X is the full vector of endogenous variables and the  are the structural residuals to be shocked
(identiﬁed in the above-mentioned way). Impulse response functions and corresponding error bands
are obtained (simulated) via Monte Carlo Integration using the RATS example program monteva2
(obtained from estima.com). Following Sims and Zha (1999), among other things, fractiles are
used instead of standard deviations in computing error bands (we use the 0.05 and 0.95 fractiles to
approximate a 90% conﬁdence interval). Generalized impulse response functions (see Koop, Pesaran
and Potter 1996 and Pesaran and Shin 1998), which are to be preferred in nonlinear models, were
also calculated. In general, qualitative results from these responses are similar to the reported ones.
5 Results
5.1 Preliminary remarks and responses to shocks in the control variables
Our VAR speciﬁcation consists of banking sector openness, the concentration, equity, loans and cash
ratios, the non-interest income share in total income, the cost-income ratio, the overnight money
market rate and the growth rate of GDP. As we do not have a full structural model for such a
large number of variables, the Cholesky decomposition method is applied in the following form. The
respective interest rate spread is the endogenous variable of interest and is therefore always placed
at the end. The cycle measures (the overnight MMR and GDP growth) start the causal chain as
they are the most exogenous variables in our setting. Balance-sheet variables are positioned before
items from the income statement. Openness comes ﬁrst after GDP growth because it is preferably
interpreted as a strategic variable (one of the reactions of the banking sector to deregulation and
liberalization). Concentration appears before the three balance-sheet ratios (equity, loans and cash
ratio) because it is seen as being partly driven by longer-term decisions as, for example, the acquisition
of participations. The ﬁrst income statement variable in the order is the share of non-interest income
in total income (the argument is similar to that used with balance-sheet items for openness) followed
by the cost-income ratio.
Table 4 features the results for the ﬁve lending rates’ spreads over the interest rate on savings
deposits, but does not report responses to shocks in the control variables. Due to the low number
of observations, hardly any shock in one of the explanatory variables is found to have statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the path of interest rate spreads and premiums, even at the 10% signiﬁcance
level. Interest rate spreads do not signiﬁcantly deviate from their baseline path (their time path with-
out any unexpected shock to the system) following shocks in the concentration ratio, the respective
loans ratio, the share of non-interest income in total operating income and the cost-income ratio.
12Table 4: Responses of interest rate spreads
Quarter 0 1 2 4
Responses to shocks in GDP growth
Commercial credit spread 0.038 0.090 * 0.076 0.047
Consumer credit spread 0.071 0.091 0.064 0.033
Housing credit spread 0.025 0.057 0.056 0.080
Hypothecary credit spread 0.015 0.050 0.044 0.031
Municipal credit spread 0.044 0.049 0.026 0.005
Responses to shocks in the overnight money market rate
Commercial credit spread 0.382 * 0.147 0.062 0.005
Consumer credit spread 0.320 0.225 0.190 0.183
Housing credit spread 0.241 0.120 0.186 0.187
Hypothecary credit spread 0.376 0.247 0.121 0.088
Municipal credit spread 0.094 0.068 0.002 0.024
With the exception of the one for the commercial credit rate, interest spreads rise somewhat
after shocks in the cash ratio in the very short term. Responses to impulses in the equity ratio are
mostly negative (signiﬁcantly for commercial, consumer and municipal credit spreads). Surprisingly,
all spreads rise with shocks in banking sector openness (contemporaneous responses are found to be
statistically signiﬁcant). Though these eﬀects are practically small, they may be (as argued above,
and in Gischer and J¨ uttner 2003) due to the fact that the European markets for loans and deposits
still are not fully integrated, so that banks try to partly make up for losses in other business by raising
interest spreads (at least in the short run).
5.2 Interest rates, GDP growth and the cyclicality of interest rate spreads
The responses of interest rate spreads to shocks in the growth rate of real GDP and the overnight
money market rate show how loan-deposit markups vary with the business and interest cycle in the
Austrian banking sector. From the ﬁrst panel of Table 4 we see that all spreads behave procyclically.
A unit (one percentage point) shock in GDP growth causes, for example, the spread of the commercial
credit rate over the savings rate to increase by 0.09 percentage points in the quarter following the
shock. However, no other deviation of a spread from its baseline path is found to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Additionally, the spreads’ responses are also practically small, having in mind
the average level of the spreads and the size of the GDP growth shock the responses were calculated
for. Responses to unit (one percentage point) shocks in the overnight money market rate conﬁrm
the presumption that such impulses lead to rising lending-deposit spreads in the short run, due to the
faster adjustment of loan rates to interest rate changes. Also in this case, most of the responses are
not statistically signiﬁcant and decline over time. Spreads of lending rates to bank bond yields are,
as asserted above, interpretable as bank markups over cost of funds as well as external bank ﬁnance
premiums.14
13Table 5: Responses of lending rate premiums over the yield of bank bonds
Quarter 0 1 2 4
Responses to shocks in GDP growth
Commercial credit premium -0.077 0.020 0.120 0.048
Consumer credit premium -0.075 0.023 0.129 0.046
Housing credit premium -0.049 0.118 0.154 -0.082
Hypothecary credit premium -0.040 0.051 0.148 -0.034
Municipal credit premium 0.007 0.067 0.180 0.095
Although no single response to GDP growth shocks in Table 5 is estimated to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, we ﬁnd these responses to be positive in the two quarters following the shock.
So also the results for the lending rate premiums do not point to a countercyclical behavior of bank
markups in Austria.
6 Summary and conclusions
This paper analyzes the cyclical behavior of interest rate spreads in the Austrian banking sector
using time series for the 1995-2003 period. Controlling for the main empirical determinants of
interest margins and spreads proposed in the literature, we ﬁnd that bank interest rate spreads
and premiums in Austria move procyclically. Thereby, we can conﬁrm the suggestion of Braumann
(2004) that Austrian bank markups do not contribute to a ﬁnancial accelerator in the propagation
of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. However, there is also no stringent evidence for the opposite, as the
positive responses of spreads to shocks in the growth rate of real GDP (our measure of the state in
the business cycle) are practically small. Additionally, a clear statement on whether the conduct of
the Austrian banking sector dampens the eﬀects of aggregate shocks would also have to examine the
cyclicality of supplied credit volumes.
Braumann (2004) argues that speciﬁc characteristics of the Austrian banking system cause the
absence of a banking-related ﬁnancial accelerator. Pronounced bank-customer relationships, on the
one hand, lead to a reduction of information asymmetries and generate comparative advantages of
incumbent banks versus (foreign) competitors, but also step up switching costs for bank customers.
Nevertheless, these relations do not imply price wars for market share in booms as well as an extensive
exertion of banks’ market power in recessions. Eﬀects of assumed interest rate and proﬁt smoothing
practices of banks on the level of interest rates and spreads make up another story, but can explain
a sparsly pronounced reaction of rates and spreads to cyclical changes in credit risk and collateral
values. However, the shrinkage of interest rate spreads in economic upturns, proposed by the ﬁnancial
accelerator, may be impeded also by other factors. Even in booms, the competition from other ﬁnance
vehicles still might be too low to induce noticeable eﬀects on bank markups, or the banks’ incentives
to depart from notional collusive arrangements are not suﬃcient.
14Notes
1Rising prices lead to increases in proﬁts if prices were below the single-period proﬁt-maximizing level before, for
example, because of switching costs and ﬁrms trying to“lock in”their customers. By raising prices, ﬁrms forgo attempts
to build market share. Hence, also in this scenario, price wars are more likely to occur in upturns.
2Bloch and Olive (2001) provide some quotations and argue that aggregate and (industry) cost inﬂation are em-
pirically important determinants of markups. Their results indicate that industry prices (and therefore markups) are
negatively related to aggregate demand in high-concentration industries. Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1998) argue that
neglected costs of capital adjustment can explain many procyclicality ﬁndings in the empirical literature. According to
their own ﬁndings, markups are negatively related to the current state of demand, but behave procyclically with respect
to expectations of future demand changes.
3Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), for example, report a negative relation of GDP growth to the“price-deposit margin” ,
which they calculate from income-statement and balance-sheet data and which includes services income.
4Scatterplots of yearly data (1955-2000) reveal that spreads and credit growth in Sweden, the USA and Canada
feature correlations which are consistent with a ﬁnancial accelerator (provided that credit growth is procyclical).
5However, the eﬀects of short-term cycles are ruled out by using yearly data and cross-country diﬀerences might
obscure the results on cyclicality (they use country-ﬁxed as well as product-ﬁxed eﬀects in their estimation).
6Monopolistic as well as oligopolistic versions of the micro-model of the banking ﬁrm can also be found in Freixas
and Rochet (1997) or Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).
7Furthermore, we will not discuss the relation of our measures and results to some other literature related to the level
of interest margins and spreads. The latter is often claimed to measure the eﬃciency with which banks intermediate
capital, is related to economic development and growth (Levine 2005), and is an issue in the competition policy of
the European Union. As there are arguments in favor of a trade-oﬀ with ﬁnancial stability (Bikker and Groeneveld
2000, Weill 2004), it is not clear whether high margins are good or bad from a social welfare perspective (Saunders
and Schumacher 2000).
8Goddard et al. (2004) also control for the industry Herﬁndahl, which has a positive inﬂuence on the ROE.
9The Austrian banking laws had to be harmonized with the standards of the European Union (EU). The whole
process has spurred competition and concentration, and improved eﬃciency in the banking sectors of the EU (Bikker
and Groeneveld 2000).
10For the diﬀerentials to the overnight money market rate, responses to interest rate shocks simply show that the
subsequent adjustment of retail rates is sluggish and not complete in the medium run (which are well-known empirical
facts, see e.g. Sander and Kleimeier 2004), with lending rates adjusting faster than deposit rates (at least in the short
run). Responses of the loan-deposit spreads (see the results section) could be divided into these reactions. Responses
to shocks in GDP growth show that lending rates rise in economic upturns (with endogenous changes in money market
rates being controlled for), whereas reactions of deposit and savings rates are smaller, change their sign over time and
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We also see that lending rate spreads over money market rates (or lending
rates themselves, as we control for the overnight money market rate as an explanatory variable) shrink after shocks in
the equity ratio in the ﬁrst quarters (with deposit rates rather unaﬀected) and rise afterwards (but deposit rates rise
more then), so that the loan-deposit spreads’ reactions stay negative.
11Some of the variables listed in the review of the empirical literature on interest margins and banking proﬁtability are
not used in this paper for the following speciﬁc reasons. No quarterly data for a quite long time period is available for
taxes and loan loss provisions. Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) are followed in not including a variable for implicit interest
payments. As argued by them, there has been a trend towards explicit pricing of banking services, as implicit interest
15payments have been eroded by deregulation, technological advances and increased competition. However, accounting
for non-interest income (as will be done in our regressions) amounts to using quite a similar variable. Several arguments
exist that lead us to not account for the importance of the banking sector (besides the one that other variables used
might also proxy for or be a product of the disintermediation trend). The total banking sector’s assets divided by GDP
do not show a disintermediation trend as they trend upwards over time. Among others, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004)
are in favor of stock market capitalization relative to real GDP as a measure for competition from other segments of
the ﬁnancial system. But the problem is that (also with the Austrian data) stock market developments are largely
price-driven. Additionally, there is evidence from the literature that, to a certain extent, bank and stock market ﬁnance
might be complements rather than substitutes. What would be needed is something like the share of new loans in
the total of new bond, share and private equity (venture capital) issues as well as new loans, for the corporate sector
only (no government bonds, for example), on a quarterly level, for a fairly long time period. Besides the fact that
this data is unavailable, such a measure would, again, only tell half the story, because the changing importance of the
banking sector also with respect to deposits and ﬁnancial investments should be accounted for. A measure like the
total assets of investment (mutual) funds relative to deposits at banks would, as it is sharply rising over time, overrate
the disintermediation trend. Interest rate volatility (proxied by the standard deviation of the overnight money market
rate) is left out because its eﬀects on the variables of interest always are far from getting statistically and practically
signiﬁcant. Finally, the inﬂation rate is assumed to be captured with the inclusion of nominal interest rates, so that
degrees of freedom can be saved.
12Equity capital therefore only comprises registered (nominal) capital and disclosed reserves (resulting in core or tier
1 capital), as well as some parts of supplementary (tier 2) capital. Subordinated debt is included, whereas undisclosed
reserves do not appear in the balance sheet. The latter, however, account for a large fraction of tier 2 capital. Therefore,
our equity measure is not compatible with the capital used in describing (the compliance with) capital adequacy rules.
The relation to the regulatory capital requirements measures (which are only available to us from 1998 on) is that
the equity ratios used in that respect include supplementary capital (tier 2 capital) in the numerator and divide by
risk-weighted assets. Therefore, our equity ratios will be considerably smaller than the ones published and interpreted
when capital adequacy is discussed.
13Potential endogeneity of explanatory variables is an issue which is typically ignored in existing empirical work on
the determinants of net interest margins, spreads and banking proﬁtability measures.
14Responses to shocks in the overnight money market rate are not reported as these are obscured by the fact that
bond yields tend to partly adjust before the interest rate shock actually occurs. Lending rate premiums therefore rise
after impulses in the overnight MMR due to rising lending rates.
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18A Data description
General remarks
Retail interest rates come from the national interest rate statistics and were, in this form, compiled from 1995 until June
2003 (from January 2003 on, the national statistics were replaced by a harmonized system for the euro area). Rates are
nominal (plus certain fees, but commissions on turnover are not included) and expressed as annual percentages. Business
coverage: Banks report the interest rate charged most frequently for new business (renewals are not considered).
Institutional coverage: Sample of 43 Monetary Financial Institutions (had decreased to 37 banks in 2003 because of
mergers). As Klein, Schubert and Swoboda (2003) argue, this sample of banks consisted of the major joint stock
banks, the state mortgage banks as well as the largest institutions of the savings bank, Raiﬀeisen credit cooperative
and Volksbank credit cooperative sectors. Aggregation method: Arithmetic averages excluding 5% of the rates at both
ends of the range. Note: Interest rates on loans from home savings banks (building and loan associations), which play
an important role for housing ﬁnance in Austria, were not recorded.
Data on proﬁt and loss account items for the banking sector comes from quarterly bank reports, balance sheet data
from monthly balance sheet reports (almost all banks operating in Austria report on the legal basis of the Austrian
Banking Act). Balance sheet items are quarterly averages of monthly (of three end-of-month) ﬁgures and, as the items
from the income statement, in millions of euros.
In general (exceptions as indicated), our data source is the Austrian Central Bank (the Oesterreichische Nationalbank,
OeNB), and the sample period ranges from the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 2003.
Interest rates
Monetary policy rate: Overnight VIBOR (Vienna Interbank Oﬀered Rate). The Eonia (Euro Overnight Index Average,
source: European Central Bank, ECB) is appended from 1999 on. Commercial credit rate: Floating-rate loans to
enterprises, usually short-term (up to 1 year). Consumer credit rate: Secured consumer loans, but not necessarily
secured by mortgage. Usually long-term, but no breakdown by maturity is available. Housing credit rate: All loans
to households used for purchasing housing space which are not mortgage loans. Rates are ﬂoating (variable) and
housing loans are typically long-term loans. Hypothecary credit rate: Mortgage loans to households and enterprises.
Floating-rate loans secured by a mortgage recorded in the land register, usually long-term. Municipal credit rate: Loans
to public-sector authorities (usually long-term). Deposit rate: Savings deposits with an agreed maturity of up to 12
months. Savings rate: Savings deposits with an agreed maturity of over 12 months. Yield of bank bonds: Secondary
market yield of bonds of domestic banks with a ﬁxed rate of interest. Average yield (quarterly averages of daily
yields) of all bonds with more than one year to maturity weighted by outstanding volumes (Source: Oesterreichische
Kontrollbank, OeKB). Note: Quarterly interest rates are simple averages of monthly ﬁgures.
Explanatory variables
Banking sector openness: Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities of the banking sector divided by total assets (percentage).
Concentration ratio: Share of the 10 largest banks’ assets in the balance sheet total of the banking sector (percentage).
Commercial loans ratio: Share of loans to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in total banking sector assets (percentage). Consumer
loans ratio: Share of consumer loans to households in total banking sector assets (percentage). Housing loans ratio:
Share of housing loans to households in total banking sector assets (percentage). Hypothecary loans ratio: Share
of mortgage loans in total banking sector assets (percentage). Municipal loans ratio: Share of loans to municipal
authorities in total banking sector assets (percentage). Equity ratio: Share of the book value of equity capital in the
balance sheet total (percentage). Cash ratio: Share of cash and central bank balances in total banking sector assets
(percentage). Non-interest income: Share of non-interest income in total operating income (percentage). Cost-income
ratio: Operating expenses divided by operating income (percentage). Overnight money market rate: As explained in
the interest rate section of this appendix. GDP growth: Growth rate of real GDP (quarterly level) relative to real GDP
four quarters ago (percentage). Data source for real GDP: WIFO (Austrian Institute of Economic Research).
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